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Migration studies has been curiously absent in British sociology. Unlike in the US, 
where the basic terms of debate on immigration and its effects have been set by 
paradigmatic oppositions between heavyweight sociologists Ð names such as 
Alejandro Portes, Richard Alba, Doug Massey, Mary Waters, Roger Waldinger, 
Saskia Sassen Ð migration studies in the UK has long been carried by other 
disciplines. There are a few exceptions, of course, but there is nothing like the 
massive prominence of sociologists as there is in British ethnic and racial studies, for 
example. The first virtue of Bridget AndersonÕs Us and Them is to have written a 
book of migration theory and policy analysis that should engage directly mainstream 
UK sociologists of citizenship, exclusion, poverty and race.  
 
At the same time, Us and Them hauls a politically charged, and quite distinctly British 
sociology, infused with a gender, race and de-colonial studies sensibility, deep into 
the heart of international migration research, which has not always done a good job 
handling the challenge of critical social theory. Anderson heeds the call for what I 
have called elsewhere a Òrebooting of migration theoryÓ. Standard debates over 
immigrants and immigration politics Ð over numbers, borders and control, over 
naturalisation, citizenship, integration and multiculturalism Ð reproduce an unthinking 
methodological nationalism. This assumes the primacy of the nation-state-society as a 
stable, receiving sovereign unit, and then treats migrants as peripheral anomalies and 
demographic noise, to be excluded as foreigners or absorbed as citizens.  Rather, as 
underlined by the Òmobilities turnÓ in the social sciences, when spatial movement is 
recognised as the norm and condition of all human life Ð and especially modernity Ð 
the constitution of all familiar spatially stable institutional structures in society needs 
to be recognised as historically contingent, changeable and inherently politicalÑthe 
thing to be explained rather than assumed.  Anderson takes this insight (the work of 
John Urry and Tim Cresswell might have been mentioned) and puts the question of 
population categories and political bordering, that is, the very units of politics Ð the 
nation-state-society and the empowered citizens that allegedly constitute it Ð at the 
heart of the analysis.  
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Using both a historical narrative of citizenship and inclusion in the UK and the 
analysis of contemporary policies on immigration, criminality and poverty, Anderson 
shows how present-day preoccupations with defining the wanted and unwanted 
international migrant, and the path to integration and becoming a ÒgoodÓ citizen that 
they should follow, are but a variant of historical constitutions of the national 
Òcommunity of valueÓ, which has and still does, variously exclude the vagrant, the 
underclass, the morally dissolute, and the criminal, from full and recognised 
membership. In doing so, Anderson unlocks a vital new perspective on the moral 
constitution of contemporary society, in which ÒcitizenshipÓ no longer designates 
equal membership across a unified and bounded population, but rather a selective 
process of shifting borderings, which decide in law, policy and democratic politics 
who ÒdeservesÓ to be able to vote, to claim welfare protection, to enjoy liberties, or to 
have a decent standard of living. The way we treat immigrants and asylum seekers, in 
other words, is just the thin edge of the wedge. Migrants are easier to designate 
ÒundeservingÓ non-members than nationals, because they were arbitrarily born poor 
elsewhere on the planet; they are easier to exploit in our economy for the same 
reason. Nationals, born here on this soil to automatic citizenship, have hitherto relied 
on a residual claim of equality for all co-nationals, to at least claim political voice and 
some degree of redistributive inclusion (democracy and the welfare state). The 
emerging politics of Òus and themÓ in the 21st century Ð which, of course, is returning 
society back to Victorian if not feudal notions of political membership Ð is now 
selectively stripping away the legitimacy of these claims for growing numbers of the 
marginal and excluded within the national population. 
 
This alarming T.H.Marshall-in-reverse nexus of ideas is applied chapter-by-chapter to 
a series of typical immigration policy arenas, in which the borders between easily 
excluded migrants and ripe-for-exclusion marginalised nationals are steadily being 
blurred. These are the Òdangerous politics of immigration controlÓ: not (only) the 
usual argument about being mean to needy foreigners at the border or ignoring their 
human rights, but more broadly an essentially Foucauldian politics of discipline and 
control which, in categorising immigrants as ÒgoodÓ or ÒbadÓ workers and putative 
citizens, enables the powers that be to generate similar modes of governance over all 
nationals as workers and citizens, thereby creating the benchmarks of performativity 
that drive the nation forward. The chapters thus unfold through narratives and close 
analysis of regressive change in law and policy in the UK on naturalisation, labour 
market demand (Òmigration managementÓ), integration, deportation, trafficking, and 
domestic work. The finger is mostly pointed at the New Labour years, with continuity 
under the Coalition government of 2010. The book reads as a litany of betrayals of the 
rights and equalities imagined as inclusive and expansive by Marshall, in the name of 
shoring up a fictive idea of national cohesion, moral/democratic community and 
national economic performance, at a time when globalisation and its manifold 
mobilities has transformed the economy of this same national ÒunitÓ into a porous, 
hyper-networked, space of flows.   
 
Unusually, Anderson does not label this slide Òneo-liberalÓ, as of course countless 
other similarly positioned critical works on contemporary politics and economy doÑ
at least not that often. David Harvey is mentioned, but there is no clear Marxist thrust 
to AndersonÕs analysis, despite its world systems views on global inequalities and 
colonial exploitation. Rather, Foucauldian logic seems to be the underlying 
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infrastructure, although the laughing bald Nietzschean is only tantalisingly present in 
the text; just a hint towards his analysis of ÒgovernmentalityÓ, without much 
exposition. In terms of other theory, the book is actually refreshingly absent of the 
over-wrought referencing of so many poorly digested continentals Ð those 
unblemished white male heroes (nearly always French and Italian) of critical and 
decolonial theory Ð  Antonio Negri, Gilles Deleuze, Giorgio Agamben, Jacques 
Rancire Ð that drive other works in the field of Òcritical migration studiesÓ.  On this 
point, Anderson stands in positive comparison to others making similar arguments: 
the widely debated work of authors such as Nicholas de Genova, Thomas Nail or 
Sandro Mezzadra. In many respects, this accessibility is a great quality; AndersonÕs 
writing is crisp and clear throughout, with impeccable empirical exposition of law, 
policy and data trends that would not be found so convincingly in these other authorÕs 
works. Yet I want to insist here on exploring the theoretical infrastructure of the book 
in part because it is so underspecified in AndersonÕs writing.  
 
Her target clearly is liberal thinking and liberal philosophy. She pinpoints the illusion 
of Òself possessiveÓ individualism, the liberalism which believes that the combination 
of rights bearing citizenship and free economic exchange can, under certain ÒjustÓ 
conditions, lead to more emancipation and (some kind of) equality for all, rather than, 
inevitably, always, growing inequalities, gender domination or Ð the typical default 
critique Ð colonial slavery. Clearly, the UK is not heading in any progressive direction 
today, on any of these points perhaps, although with rising middle classes worldwide, 
the debate about global inequalities is an empirical and complex one, not one to be 
adjudicated exclusively on reductive Marxist terms. Much of what Anderson writes is 
stated more reasonably as an exploration of ÒtensionsÓ within liberal democracyÑ
and, yes, any good liberal would respond that, precisely, liberalism is a philosophy of 
tension and imperfection, of Isaiah BerlinÕs crooked timbers, of J.S. MillÕs 
experimental consequentialism, of MarshallÕs tentative incrementalismÑnot the top 
down Òneo-liberalÓ utopias of Friedrich Hayek imposed in the name of ÒliberalismÓ 
today. There is, frustratingly, no engagement with serious, older liberal classics such 
as these; nor with barely any recent liberal works on immigration and citizenshipÑso 
no Michael Walzer, no Charles Taylor, no Will Kymlicka, no Bhikhu Parekh, and 
only a little Joseph Carens. Comparative historical sociology on nationalism and 
citizenship is also absent: there is no attempt to engage with the alternate Weberian 
paradigm of Rogers Brubaker and Christian Joppke; no trace of Ernest Gellner, 
although Benedict Anderson makes a late appearance, and the benevolent influence of 
the Oxford/Warwick sociologist Robin Cohen can be felt throughout. Instead, a 
swingeing critique of the legacy of Locke, Smith and Kant is mainly carried by 
references to works of UK critical philosophy scholars (Phil Cole, Laura Brace), and a 
very light touch social history. More substantially, there seems to be an influence of 
the decolonial heroes, David Theo Goldberg and Charles Mills; and of the feminist 
scholarship of Carole Pateman. The critique, then, obviously tends towards the 
standard relational/positional one: that one manÕs rights and autonomy is inevitably 
another (wo)manÕs domination and servitude; and that one white manÕs citizenship is 
inevitably another black manÕs slavery. This dogmatism is not the tone of the book Ð 
Anderson is a humanistic and open minded, activist scholar Ð but fundamentally the 
political implications of her work are hugely pessimistic and over-determined. Only a 
couple of pages at the very end contain anything like an alternate political vision: the 
vague hope that a critical work like this, and its ÒunmooringÓ of people, nation and 
state, might assist in the release of an emancipatory politics of Òglobal imaginaries 
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and reclaimed historiesÓ; that there is a multitude of Òshared imagined futures and 
pastsÓ, awaiting us somewhere beyond the despairing Guardian op-eds and the 
closing of national borders everywhere.  And, for all this, we have the racist liberal 
men to blame: once upon a time, Locke, Smith and Kant, with their universalist 
apologetics for colonialism; now those politicians with their think tank quotes and 
falsely progressive pietiesÑfrom David Blunkett to Gordon Brown, David Cameron 
to Nick Clegg. 
 
IÕm exaggerating, but only a little. This mode of argumentation in ÒcriticalÓ British 
social science of the last twenty years is so familiar as to be unquestioned, polemical 
orthodoxy (consider, for example, superstar UK sociologists like Imogen Tyler or Bev 
Skeggs). Both the damning of New Labour and its continuities, and the romantic 
promise of socialist internationalism somewhere over the rainbow are overworn 
tropes. British sociology, in particular, in all its patent impotency, has been so long 
fueled by its self-righteous fury at the Òneo-liberalismÓ of New Labour; with the 
subsequent analysis of its horrors on immigration, race, welfare, poverty, austerity, 
housing and policing suggesting that everyone must have been living all these years in 
something little different to PinochetÕs Chile. Well, one should be careful what one 
wishes forÑif one wants oneÕs analysis to be factually true. My point is not to defend 
the miserable legacy of those years, or deny that some of the critique is true, but 
rather to ask how our tools of analysis must start to be more sophisticated in their 
understanding of political philosophy before we do indeed find ourselves living in a 
society in which liberal democratic values have been extinguishedÑas they have been 
sadly for decades in the corridors of many UK sociology departments. After Brexit 
and Trump, what do we say now? On one reading of Anderson, it might just be a 
shrug and a glib, ÒTold you so!Ó. Foucauldians everywhere are rubbing their hands 
with cynical glee that their worst nightmares are now coming true: as liberal 
democracy is extinguished again, as it was in the 1930s between resurgent neo-
fascism and Marxist alternatives in the real worldÑand not just in theory text books. 
But that only begs the question. Was everyone living already in PinochetÕs Chile in 
the era of Òmanaged migrationÓ, Òpoints based selectionÓ and Òfree movement of EU 
workersÓ? 
 
Here, some of the clear limitations of AndersonÕs UK-centric analysis become clearÑ
the lack of any kind of comparative perspective to enable an evaluation of what has 
really happened in the UK. How we might begin to distinguish again more or less 
progressive differences and possibilities, now lost, within the politics tried out 
between New Labour, the Coalition years, and the Post-Brexit regime; or whether her 
framework would be a useful heuristic, and equally damning, if it considered 
immigration politics in France or Germany, where capitalism is regulated differently, 
or the US, where the state has far less control over borders or informality? The 
inability to recognise and assess empirical variation is a feature of Foucauldian work 
in general, as much as it is all those Marxist scholars who use Òneo-liberalismÓ as a 
simplistic shorthand for the ubiquitous evil of ÒcapitalismÓ, then, now, here, there, 
and everywhere.  
 
One thing absent from the book is any sense of how positive recent economic 
migration has been in the UKÑin its dramatic cosmopolitan effects on society, as 
much as its largely beneficial driving of its highly internationalised  economy. In a 
book all about discipline and control, servitude and inequalities, there is no sense of 
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how much more open to migration and social change Britain was during this period 
than any of its neighboursÑor how much more attractive as a destination. This is 
partly because Anderson does not deal with the effectiveness in the UK of the EUÕs 
core principle of non-discrimination by nationality, which drove a post-national stake 
into both discriminatory employment practices and ideological illusions of economic  
sovereignty during the era of open free bordered EU migration to the UK. The 
institution of EU citizenship is for her just another iniquitous differentiation; designed 
almost by definition to exclude non-Europeans, and sharpen their disadvantage. Yet 
the super-diversity it heralded was transforming race, culture and nation at all levels, 
enabling the UK to move towards the kind of genuinely post-post colonial, global 
society in which entitlement to equal treatment in a job interview or access to a house 
rental would never depend on oneÕs nationality, whether signalled by skin colour or 
passport. That is, of course, all over now, after the referendum. And Ð as some radical 
voices such as Kehinde Andrews have said Ð Brexit is also a big step backwards for 
the diasporic claims of British BAME (Black and Asian Minority Ethnic) groups, as 
much as the Europeans it will disenfranchise. Nationality, in England at least, has 
clearly been re-racialised as white ethnicity; not least, the day Nigel Farage unveiled 
his infamous poster of asylum seekers, and Jo Cox was murdered in the streets of 
West Yorkshire. And so the UK speeds backwards: towards a purely colonial view of 
the world, and the privileged claims of the democratic ÒBritish peopleÓ over rights, 
equal treatment and anyone seen as a foreigner.  
 
My criticisms relate to paradoxes found in critical works on migration, nationalism 
and globalisation, that very little work anywhere is addressing. They do not invalidate 
the insights of the book, nor its thorough and sometimes shocking assessment of 
specific trends in UK immigration policy. Bridget AndersonÕs Us and Them is an 
essential contribution that enlarges significantly the potentials of migration studies 
and general political sociology. It deserves a wide audience well beyond its UK 
readers, who will recognise only too well its gloomy assessment of the last few 
decades. Anderson is absolutely right that the ÒunmooringÓ of our closed, 
methodologically nationalist assumptions about society, populations and democratic 
legitimacy is crucially needed. With dark times to come, her work may provide an 
even more accurate diagnosis of the near future than it has of the recent past. 
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